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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents estimates of the rate of profit on fourteen countries in the long run. 
The performance shows a clear downward trend, although there are periods of partial 
recovery in both core and peripheral countries. The behavior of the profit rate confirms the 
predictions made by Marx, about the historical trend of the mode of production. Finally, an 
estimate of the global rate of profit for the last six decades is done, also highlighting the 
particular role of China in systemic profitability. 
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Introduction 
 
There is, in the origins of classical political economy, a concern about the downward trend 
in the rate of profit. Adam Smith and David Ricardo, among others, have argued in their 
own way the existence of this trend2. The systemic tendency to crisis and insufficient profit 
generation has also been reflected by other exponents of different economic schools, 
expressing, on one hand, the eminently real character of the trend, and on the other, the 
theoretical particularities of these economic schools3. 
Marx established, as the most important law of political economy, the law of the falling 
tendency of the rate of profit. Ricardo sustained this trend on the increase of labor costs 
due to decreasing agricultural productivity, recognizing the necessity to expand production 
on badlands. However, the Ricardian assumption of a diminishing marginal productivity in 
agriculture (that neoclassicals extrapolated to all productive activity) has proved unreal. 
The rate of profit shows a downward trend, not because productivity decreases, but 
precisely because it increases in historical terms. 
The capitalist production process is a valorization process (M - M') through the exploitation 
of the labor force (M - C ... P ... - C ' - M'). The capital advanced in the form of money (M) 
is exchanged for commodities (C) - means of production, inputs (constant capital, CC) and 
labor (variable capital, VC) - . The labor force, unlike the means of production and inputs, 
has the power to generate an additional value that required to its own reproduction. Thus, 
the production process itself (P) in which the labor force, using the means of production, 
transforms inputs is realized, resulting in a mass of commodities of a greater value than 
the prior (M '). In the final product appears transferred this constant capital employee, plus 
an additional amount generated by labor force, equal to variable capital (reproduction 
value of labor force) exchanged with the capitalist, and a surplus-value. The capital is thus 
transmuting from money-capital to commodity-capital, then productive-capital, to finally 
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return to the form of commodity-capital and money-capital of a greater value. This last step 
is the one that involves the sale on the market (C'-M '), the realization of the profit and the 
completion of the valorization process.  
The necessity each capital has to sell at a lower price than competitors, and cover a larger 
market share, implies a constantly increasing expenditure on fixed capital, equipment and 
infrastructure, which allows to increase productivity and to reduce the individual value of 
commodities, including the labor force. The relative growth of constant capital is given at 
the expense of variable capital for the reproduction of the labor force, the latter being the 
only source of profit. The capital thus finds its own internal limit. As such, its sole purpose 
is to increase the surplus value extracted from the labor force, but its only mean is by the 
relative increasing of constant capital to variable capital. 
In Marx's terms, this trend decline in the rate of profit would occur regardless of a decline 
or stagnation in wages relative to profits, i.e., a rate of surplus value (profits/variable 
capital) constant or increasing: “This mode of production produces a progressive relative 
decrease of the variable capital as compared to the constant capital, and consequently a 
continuously rising organic composition of the total capital. The immediate result of this is 
that the rate of surplus-value, at the same, or even a rising, degree of labour exploitation, 
is represented by a continually falling general rate of profit. The progressive tendency of 
the general rate of profit to fail is, therefore, just an expression peculiar to the capitalist 
mode of production of the progressive development of the social productivity of labour”4. 
 
The downward trend in the rate of profit is not necessarily imposed in a steady pace, or is 
exempt from recovery periods. There are factors counteracting this trend, some of which 
have been identified by Marx and Grossmann: cheapening of constant capital, payment of 
the labor force below its value, increasing turnover speed of capital, capital export, foreign 
trade to expand markets, among others. 
These counteracting factors are characteristic of the system as its tendency to collapse. In 
his analysis of the trend, Marx neglects some of these elements to focus on the central 
and essential long-term determinants. These counteracting factors may alleviate only in a 
relative way the decrease in the rate of profit in the long run. Their own characteristics, 
which initially tend to increase profitability, then get diluted or reversed in the opposite 
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direction. For example, if the cheapening of the elements of constant capital, reduce its 
relative value to variable capital, raising profitability, then will promote increased spending 
on constant capital, in the context of capitalist competition. Grossmann concludes that, 
without these countertendencies, the collapse of the system would be much more abrupt: 
"The operation of these countertendencies transforms the breakdown into a temporary 
crisis, so that the accumulation process is not something continuous but takes the form of 
periodic cycles ( ... ) as these countertendencies are gradually enmasculated , the 
antagonisms of world capitalism become progressively sharper and the tendency towards 
breakdown increasingly approaches its final form of an absolute collapse"5. 
If the system tends to lower returns, gradually exhausts its own sustenance. But is there 
empirical evidence of this trend? This paper attempts to settle the debate about this 
immanent tendency of the capitalist mode of production to liquidate its own bases. 
 
The rate of profit 
In Marxian terms, the rate of profit is calculated from the ratio of profits and, on the other 
side, capital advanced in machinery, infrastructure (fixed constant capital, FCC ), inputs 
(circulating constant capital, CCC) and wages (variable capital, VC). Fixed constant capital 
transfers its value to the product for several years. The constant and variable circulating 
capital is transferred on the final product after every production process, and gets 
recovered by the capitalist once the commodities are sold, to be newly released to 
production and valorized. 
Circulating capital consumed on inputs and wages, as shown in the national accounts 
(Intermediate Consumption -IC- and Wage Bill -W-), must be divided by the annual 
number of turnovers (N). Faced with increasing turnover speed and organic composition of 
capital (CC/VC) due to largest expenditure on constant capital, wages increasingly have 
less of a reason for a lack of profitability, as a cost to capitalists. 
             RoP =               P              =                  P                 . 
                       FCC + IC + W             FCC + CCC + VC. 
                                                         N     N 
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However, given the difficulty of calculating the constant and variable circulating capital, the 
rate of return on fixed capital is sufficient to analyze the evolution of the profitability in a 
country. So that, in this paper we will use as an expression of the rate of profit: 
 
     RoP =   P  . 
               FCC 
 
The rate of profit on fixed capital tends, however, to converge with the Marxian rate of 
profit in the long run. The reason for this is simple. The growth in turnover speed of 
circulating capital steadily reduces the participation of that circulating capital in the total 
capital advanced, ie, related to fixed capital. 
 
Ricardian theories rooted on profit squeeze, supported by "heterodox" and many Marxists, 
wrongly identified the labor cost faced by capitalists with the annual wage bill. By not 
considering turnovers of circulating capital, they changed the setting axis of the 
determination, overestimating labor costs. In countries like the U.S., Japan and the 
Netherlands, compared to wage bills exceeding 50 % of GDP, the turnover speed is such 
that the true labor cost to the capitalists, the annual variable capital, is about 5%. 
Minimizing the advanced variable capital relative to constant capital, increased capital 
composition (CC/VC) that fails to be offset by increases in the rate of surplus value (P/VC), 
is the pillar on which the trend of capital to breakdown or collapse is sustained. Today, in 
the core countries, the CC/VC ratio is near to 40-16. In this context profit squeeze theories, 
very popular in the sixties and seventies, lost their strength, regardless of any influence of 
wage behavior in the short term. 
Among studies of the rate of profit on fixed capital in particular countries, profit/wage 
shares has not been the main determinant of the rate of profit´s performance. It has been 
the output-capital ratio, the reduction of value added related to fixed capital7. 
The rate of profit on fixed capital has been, by far, the most commonly used measure in 
studies on capital profitability. In a previous study8, we performed a comparison for four 
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countries on the Marxian rate of profit but, otherwise this case, all studies that address an 
international comparison, due to data availability, focus on the rate of return on fixed 
capital. Chan-Lee and Sutch, in one of the first comparative analyses, studied the profit 
rates of OECD countries for the period 1960-1980, clearly reflecting the decline due to the 
profitability crisis in the seventies. Li et al conducted a study that considers the long-term 
profitability for the UK, U.S., Japan and the Euro zone (from the 60s) in the context of a 
historical analysis of the global hegemony of successive states in the world system. 
Duménil & Lévy also compared the profit rates levels for these countries, although in a 
more limited temporal range. Zachariah makes a similar exercise, adding too China and 
India. However, he does not estimate the return on reproductive fixed capital, but 
additionally includes dwellings, which are not part of the fixed capital and the process of 
capitalist production itself9. 
Estimates for fourteen countries are presented in this article, in some cases covering more 
than a century of history, and representing more than half of world production in the last 
seventy years10. In relation to the work of Li et al, are incorporated on the longer term 
(series of more than a century of extension) estimates for Germany, Argentina, Sweden 
and the Netherlands. The inclusion of Argentina in the early twentieth century, as well as 
Korea and China in recent decades, allows us a better interpretation of the most dynamic 
peripheral areas of accumulation, during some particular periods, in their relation to the 
general trend of profitability. 
In all cases, the rate of profit arises as the ratio of net profits and fixed constant capital (net 
reproductive capital stock) of the whole economy, valued at current prices. The exception 
is the U.S., whose estimate is based only on the private corporate sector. Finally, 
statistical and methodological appendixes for each country are included, specifying the 
estimate´s sources. 
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Movement of capital and rate of profit 
In Volume III of Capital, Marx develops the general process of capitalist production on the 
existence of different individual capitals. Yield spreads between different areas (between 
industries or national spaces) foster an influx of capital to the most profitable branches or 
countries. This influx intensifies competition by investing in fixed capital, resulting in a 
general decline of profitability in that industry or national space. The own action of 
individual capitals to increase their own productivity is what ultimately ends up eroding 
general profit rates. These constant movements involve a tendency to equalization and fall 
of the rates of profit11. 
In parallel, a conclusion that emerges from this work is that, in historical terms, profitability 
in core countries is actually lower, due to higher relative levels of fixed capital 
accumulation. So that in these countries, the production processes required to develop a 
higher minimum capital. However, the peripheral countries have a greater relative decline 
in recent decades compared to the core countries, which is usually expressed in higher 
rates of accumulation and growth for the recent period. 
The historical development of capital will promote the entry of peripheral countries in the 
world market, with particular dominance of certain agricultural and mining branches, driven 
by cheap and mass production of means of production -including transport - in the core 
countries and the favorable international relative prices of agriculture products and raw 
materials. The late years of XIX century are crossed by the great 1871-1873 general crisis, 
which would imply a steady decline in the rate of profit for the period in core countries and 
a major boost to capital in peripheral countries. The full consolidation of imperialism in the 
last decades of the century has a strong relationship with the counteracting elements of 
the tendency to collapse (export of capital cheapening of constant capital inputs produced 
more easily in the periphery, etc.). Given the sharp decline in the rate of profit during the 
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seventies, a growing mass of capital was overaccumulated. The export of capital to the 
periphery allowed a significant portion of that mass to be valorized , usually at higher 
profitability levels, based on the production of commodities bearing ground rent and 
related activities (infrastructure , etc.). In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the 
downward trend will show a more stable path, less pronounced in relation to the years 
marked by the consequences of the general crisis of 1871-1873. 
During the postwar period, the entry into world market for certain peripheral national 
spaces, the most dynamics of the period, was not based on bearing land rent goods 
production, but through the production of industrial goods, firstly related to the textile 
industry but subsequently increased in volume and complexity, to achieve a high industrial 
development, as in the Korean case. 
Regardless of the specific role in particular capitalist developments , the movement of 
capital in search of higher returns is not only international, but also national, ie , capital 
previously increased in such national space by exploiting its labor force , which 
accumulates and is reinvested there. This seems to be an important aspect in the postwar 
capitalist development in East Asia although, strictly speaking, is a general process of 
historical development of capital. Faced with previous and contemporary processes, 
especially Latin American ones, the capital contribution in the form of foreign direct 
investment may have been relatively minor. 
However, the growth of accumulation and declining profitability remains whether controls 
or restrictions on international capital mobility, and although the highest levels of 
performance are capitalized by own country's capitals, the economic fundamentals 
described by Marx continue operating. Regarding the downward trend in the rate of profit, 
accumulation laws remain valid regardless of the nationality of the more developed capital 
prevailing in a particular nation or specific characteristics of their national bourgeoisies. 
Indeed, Japan and Korea have probably experienced the largest decreases in profitability 
during the war, certainly since well above average levels. 
 
 
 
The rate of profit from the mid-nineteenth century 
The rate of profit in the long run shows a clear downward trend, shared by both the core 
and oldest capitalist development as the peripheral ones12. 
 
a) The core countries 
For the core countries, our series start in the second half of the XIX century, marked by the 
general crisis of 1871-1873 that, as noted earlier, would imply a sharp fall in profitability, to 
show some stability in the early decades of the twentieth century. The presence of the 
three national spaces that successively became the core of the development of the mode 
of production for several centuries (Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States) , 
together with the two countries which otherwise posed strong economic competition to 
American hegemony throughout the twentieth century (Germany and Japan) , gives their 
series a particular relevance reflecting the systemic trend. 
 
The rate shows a sharp decline in the general crisis of 1930 and a subsequent recovery 
whose highest point is given by the Second World War. Anyway, after the war, the rate 
drops so that finally re-locates in the previous trend line. That is, capital could not escape 
the trend development even through the wildest barbarism in the history of mankind. 
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Figure N°1 - Average rate of profit in core countries (1869-2010). 
Certainly, this barbarism allowed to temporarily expand the projection of the collapse (ie, in 
the thirties, the trend line were obviously much more pronounced in its fall). 
From XIX century to the seventies of the XX there was, except for the period 1930-1944, a 
very regular trend (marked by the proximity of the points to the line) which would be again 
interrupted by a sharp decline during the period 1970 - 1982. The subsequent partial 
recovery has been very limited. While in the former case the recovery passed from an 
average rate of 16% in 1932 to 27.3 % in 1943, in this one passed from 10.8% in 1982 to 
14.6 % in 2007, the higher level since 1973. The capital inability to restore its profitability is 
given not only by the slight rise but the extended period of time involved to reach the peak 
of their recovery, especially considering that in recent decades it was promoted 
unsuccessfully fuller capacity to act for many of the counteracting factors (trade, financial 
and investment liberalization, worsening labor conditions). The last decades clearly appear 
as those with lower levels of profitability, almost repeating in 2009 the historic trough of 
1982, and thus reversing the cycle of very limited recovery started in the eighties. 
In the U.S. case, successor of the Netherlands and the UK in the global hegemony, the 
profit rate is significantly lower than the rest from the late nineteenth century until the 
Second World War. Whether our measurement is bounded to the private sector, it also 
expressed the great development of the productive forces in the United States, and its 
consolidation as a major exporter of capital and foreign investors since the early twentieth 
century. After the Crisis of 1930, there will be a sustained recovery in the rate of profit, 
mainly from its entry into the Second World War in 1941, and reaching its historical peak in 
1944. This rise will reduce the differentials between American and European profitability. 
The postwar period was characterized by a higher rate of profit in European countries (and 
a greater economic expansion), which nevertheless present a greater rate of decline in 
relation to the United States. 
Within the European context, there were highest rates in Germany, Netherlands and 
Sweden during the nineteenth century in relation to the United Kingdom. Since the early 
twentieth century these differentials would be virtually discounted. Due to high capital 
accumulation rates in Germany and the lower profit rate since then, just as in the case of 
the United States, that country will become one of the major capital exporters, with an 
increasing amount of foreign investment by German companies. The end of British 
hegemony, although it had been previously brewing, coincides with its sharp decline in the 
rate of profit after the First World War. The picture in Germany and the United States 
during the twenties shows a greater profitability in the North American country compared 
to previous years to war, while in Germany the return on capital was even lower. The 
general crisis of 30 virtually leveled the profit rate in these two countries, both in regard to 
the 1932 record low as the subsequent recovery. 
 
 
Japan experienced a tremendous economic dynamism during the postwar, which allowed 
it to become a main capitalist power, gaining positions in the world market on productive 
branches or phases where countries like the U.S., UK and Germany lost competitiveness 
(from textiles to electronics). However, this potential, the clear profitability spread relative 
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Figure N°2 - Rate of profit in Germany, UK and US (1850-2010). 
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Figure N°3 - Rate of profit in Japan, Netherlands and Sweden (1850-2010). 
Netherlands
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Japan
to the rest, derived precisely in such a capital accumulation that finally collapsed the rate 
of profit, immersing Japanese economy into a chronic crisis during the last decades13. 
 
b ) The peripheral countries 
The most dynamic periods of peripheral countries in terms of production and trade show 
significant profitability spreads relative to the core countries. The specific levels tend, in 
addition to decrease, to converge, but generally remains differentials. Reached a certain 
point, profitability in peripheral countries falls more markedly from much higher levels, and 
tends to adjust to the general trend, expressed by the central countries. Probably the most 
eloquent cases are Argentina and Korea, countries that, at different historical moments, 
were among the most dynamics in the periphery. 
 
For what reason the core countries express further the general trend of systemic 
profitability? They show higher development of productive forces and relative contribution 
to the world production, due to a wider accumulation of capital. In this sense, the yield 
differentials in many peripheral countries, at least in many lapses, being crossed during 
cycles by strong devalorization processes and devaluation crisis, reduce their potential of 
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Figure N°4 - Rate of profit in core countries, Argentina, Brazil and Korea (1885-2010). 
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counteracting to the general trend, by descending, despite their higher profitability after the 
devaluation, their share in the world aggregate output. Thus, their higher levels of 
profitability are formed in a context of reducing their own contribution to the systemic mass 
of profits. This applies, for example, to the growth in profitability in Chile during the 
seventies and eighties, in Argentina for several periods after crises and devaluations, or 
the UK in the interwar period. Opposite cases like Korean are also presented during the 
postwar. Its biggest impact on global production, from a remarkable development of the 
productive forces, is performed in conjunction with an exacerbated decline in profitability, 
exemplifying again Marx's assertion that the downward trend in the rate of profit expresses 
the development of the productive forces in the mode of production. In recent decades, 
however, the contribution of the core countries to the world economy has fell, increasing 
further their contribution peripheral Asian countries like China and Korea itself. 
 
c ) The world rate of profit and the role of China 
Figure No. 5 shows the average rate of profit in the fourteen countries and in core and 
peripheral ones. As noted above, profitability in peripheral countries falls even more 
sharply, being mainly in the central countries where the rate experienced a higher recovery 
, although very slight, since 1982. 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
1
8
69
1
8
74
1
8
79
1
8
84
1
8
89
1
8
94
1
8
99
1
9
04
1
9
09
1
9
14
1
9
19
1
9
24
1
9
29
1
9
34
1
9
39
1
9
44
1
9
49
1
9
54
1
9
59
1
9
64
1
9
69
1
9
74
1
9
79
1
9
84
1
9
89
1
9
94
1
9
99
2
0
04
2
0
09
Figure N°5 - World rate of profit and average rate in core and peripheral countries 
(1869-2010). 
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The global rate of profit arising from the series presented here may be a result from simple 
average or from weighted average of the different national rates. The weighted rate of 
profit, which is further related to the Marxian in the sense that expresses the return on total 
social capital (here reduced to fourteen countries in the period from 1955 to 2010 
accounted for 57.3 % of the world economy), because individual rates are weighted by the 
share of each country in the fourteen countries aggregate production as a whole, 
understanding that, from a systemic perspective, the influence on the overall profitability of 
the variation in national rates is related to the size of the individual economies. 
The average rate has a stronger tendency to decline than the weighted one, largely due to 
a fall in national profitability spreads. Expressions of this are the remarkable fall of the 
average rate and the standard deviation, during the seventies and early eighties, as well 
as the inability to recover their previous levels. The higher relative capital expansion during 
postwar in countries like Japan, Korea, México and Argentina, which had higher profit 
rates, has been eroding, by its own action in these national spaces, those differentials. 
Thus, the increasing competition between national spaces, including peripherals, to 
present more favorable conditions to capital under global competition, lowers profit rate´s 
spreads, presenting in the last two decades very similar trajectories both the average rate 
and weighted rate without China. 
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Figure N°6 - World rate of profit. Simple mean (RopM), weighted (RoPW), weighted 
excluding China (Rop-Ch) and standar deviation of the simple mean (StD, right axis), 
(1955-2010). 
RoPM
RoPW
RoP-Ch
StD
The growth cycle of the world economy during the first decade of the century had, as its 
main dynamic element, the increase of capital hegemony in China, as seen in the highest 
growth between 2001 and 2008 of the weighted rate including this country, in relation with 
the weighted without this country. The behavior of the rate of profit in China has a growing 
influence in the systemic accumulation. Behind its emergence as one of the major 
capitalist economies of the world are concentrated, from the perspective of accumulation 
as a global phenomenon, many counteracting factors - payment of the labor force below 
its value, cheapening of constant capital elements, capital export, foreign trade – of the 
falling tendency of the rate of profit. But a further reading arises about the historical 
significance of this advent of China. The series shows a peak, in 1997, of the recovery 
from the 1982´s trough. The period 1998-2001 is the first, since 1982, in which rates show 
a steady decrease14. The deepening of the capitalist transformation of China since 2001, 
has been a focal point for capital in the attempt to break this new phase of fall, of which 
China itself was not free. 
 
The widening gap between the two weighted rates (with and without China) for 2002-2008 
sets the tone of the growing contribution of China to the global rise in profitability. In 2008 
the weighted rate (20.9%), the closest measure to the actually existing rate, exceeds the 
                                                          
14
 Usually, explanations of the crisis in the peripheral countries during this period (South East Asia, 
Russia, Brazil, Argentina) have not even suggested a relationship with a cycle of declining 
profitability but have been forwarded to characterize it as a crisis caused for purely financial or 
economic policy issues. The same reading is the one that has prevailed on the current global crisis. 
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Figure N°7 - World rate of profit and China (1955-2010). 
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average rate (19.8%) and the weighted without China (16.4%)15. In that year, China roses 
4.5 percentage points the global weighted rate (in 2001, roses just 1.4%) which indeed 
exceeds, unlike the other two measures, its 1997 peak. The growth of China´s rate since 
the cyclic trough of 2001 reach a peak in 2008 and then collapsed in 2009, from 31.8% to 
20 %. The current crisis places the rate, both in China and globally, more or less near the 
trend marked in the 1998-2001 period. The recovery cycle of 2002-2008 seems finally 
ended. The same can be said about the long cycle of recovery since 1982. The crisis of 
profitability and China´s rising tensions, are thus an expression of the general crisis and 
the depletion of capital ability to counteract the action of the global trend in the current 
historical context. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The downward trend of the rate of profit, its empirical confirmation, highlights the 
historically limited nature of capitalist production. If the rate of profit marks the vitality of the 
system, the logical conclusion is that it approaches further to an endpoint. 
Many considerations were made on the ability of capital to overcome the crisis and 
regenerate constantly. Periodic crises are specific to this mode of production, and allow, 
ultimately, a partial recovery of profitability. This regeneration capacity is a characteristic 
aspect of capital and the cyclical nature of the capitalist economy. But the periodic nature 
of these crises has not stopped the downward trend of the rate of profit on the long term. 
So that, compared to those claims on the inexhaustible capacity of capital to restore the 
rate of profit and its own vitality, and therefore consider the mode of production as a 
natural and a-historical phenomenon, it´s necessary to assert its inevitable historical 
transience, in the light of empirical evidence. 
Obviously, there is no specific date on which to place this point that, moreover, must be 
understood rather as a particular historical period that poses significant political challenges 
for the working class. However, we have made projections of the linear trend of the 
average rate of profit in the core countries, according to its trajectory until relevant years. 
Although the 0% profit rate should not be regarded as the real limit of capital, but higher 
                                                          
15
 Since China series starts in 1978, and considering its marginality in global capitalism during the 
previous years, has been applied to the weighted rate which includes China, for the period 1955-
1977, the variation of weighted one without China. 
levels, the years which the trend line reaches 0 % were considered. For the year 1900, the 
trend would have reached 0% in 1990. For 1919, in 2024. For 1932, in 2007. For 1944, in 
2025. For 1955, in 2040. For 1970, in 2055. For 1980, in 2046. For 2010, in 2056. For the 
peripheral countries, this exercise marked, for the year 1970, 0% rate projected in the year 
2072. For the year 1980, in 2050, and for 2010, in 2064.  
 
Two points can be highlighted from these projection exercises. As noted earlier, the trend 
does not develop in a steady way but changes its slope according to the historical moment 
and the counteracting factors. So, by 2010, the projected limit in 1900 had moved 66 
years, from 1990 to 2056. However, and secondly, the progress of this trend continues, 
increasingly reducing the number of years with respect to the projected limit, which tends, 
on the other hand, to remain fixed in the middle of this century. The inability of capital, and 
the counteracting factors, to revert its tendency in recent decades is reflected then like 
being unable to move forward this hypothetical limit. Well worth repeating at this point 
Grossmann´s quote: “…as these countertendencies are gradually enmasculated, the 
antagonisms of world capitalism become progressively sharper and the tendency towards 
breakdown increasingly approaches its final form of an absolute collapse." 
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Statistical Annex 
 
World Rate of Profit, simple mean (RoPM), weighted (RoPW), and weighted without China 
(RoP-CH) (1955-2010). 
Year  RoPM RoPW RoP-CH Year  RoPM RoPW RoP-CH 
1955 32,0% 25,2% 23,9% 1983 19,4% 17,3% 15,6% 
1956 31,2% 23,4% 22,2% 1984 20,3% 18,5% 16,9% 
1957 31,3% 23,5% 22,3% 1985 20,2% 19,0% 17,1% 
1958 30,1% 23,0% 21,9% 1986 20,4% 19,1% 16,9% 
1959 30,4% 24,0% 22,8% 1987 20,7% 18,9% 16,8% 
1960 32,1% 25,9% 24,6% 1988 21,2% 19,2% 16,9% 
1961 31,5% 25,8% 24,5% 1989 21,1% 19,0% 17,2% 
1962 30,3% 25,5% 24,2% 1990 20,6% 18,7% 17,3% 
1963 30,6% 25,4% 24,2% 1991 21,1% 19,3% 17,2% 
1964 32,0% 26,4% 25,0% 1992 20,5% 19,3% 17,0% 
1965 30,6% 26,8% 25,4% 1993 20,1% 19,6% 16,8% 
1966 30,0% 26,3% 25,0% 1994 20,9% 19,8% 17,5% 
1967 29,3% 25,7% 24,4% 1995 21,4% 19,8% 17,5% 
1968 29,5% 26,2% 24,9% 1996 21,1% 19,8% 18,1% 
1969 29,8% 25,7% 24,4% 1997 21,6% 20,3% 18,5% 
1970 28,5% 24,2% 23,0% 1998 20,6% 19,3% 17,8% 
1971 27,0% 23,4% 22,2% 1999 20,3% 19,3% 17,8% 
1972 27,2% 23,4% 22,2% 2000 20,1% 18,6% 17,1% 
1973 28,3% 23,3% 22,2% 2001 19,2% 17,9% 16,5% 
1974 26,5% 20,9% 19,8% 2002 19,0% 18,5% 16,7% 
1975 22,9% 19,5% 18,5% 2003 19,6% 19,5% 17,2% 
1976 23,9% 20,2% 19,2% 2004 20,4% 20,6% 17,7% 
1977 23,8% 20,1% 19,1% 2005 20,5% 20,3% 17,8% 
1978 23,9% 20,0% 18,9% 2006 21,0% 19,9% 17,7% 
1979 22,8% 19,1% 18,0% 2007 21,1% 20,2% 17,8% 
1980 21,8% 18,2% 16,7% 2008 19,9% 21,0% 16,4% 
1981 20,0% 17,1% 16,0% 2009 17,1% 17,0% 15,6% 
1982 18,9% 16,3% 14,7% 2010 18,4% 16,5% 15,6% 
 
Rate of profit in core countries and Argentina, five years average (1850-2010) 
 Years Core Countries Germany U.S. Netherl. Japan U.K. Sweden Argentina 
1850-54       56,2%     70,4%   
1855-59 50,4%     55,5%   30,6% 59,9%   
1860-64 47,8%     54,4%   33,5% 55,4%   
1865-69 44,8% 43,5% 21,5% 49,4%   32,2% 56,3%   
1870-74 40,6% 36,2% 22,6% 51,0%   31,7% 61,3%   
1875-79 37,5% 44,6% 25,1% 51,7%   27,8% 38,2%   
1880-84 37,5% 42,8% 24,3% 53,0%   28,1% 39,4%   
1885-89 35,8% 34,3% 12,3% 62,7% 39,1% 30,1% 36,3%   
1890-94 33,7% 32,5% 10,2% 52,1% 39,2% 29,0% 39,1%   
1895-99 32,1% 24,0% 13,5% 42,3% 39,8% 30,9% 41,8%   
1900-04 30,2% 19,2% 14,5% 37,2% 43,8% 27,1% 39,2%   
1905-09 29,5% 17,0% 14,8% 33,4% 41,2% 27,2% 43,5%   
1910-14 29,5% 15,6% 10,8% 34,2% 40,4% 27,8% 43,1% 93,3% 
1915-19 29,6%   14,1%   37,3% 26,3% 40,7% 83,0% 
1920-24 25,1%   14,8% 33,7% 36,5% 15,5% 26,6% 95,1% 
1925-29 24,2% 10,9% 15,3% 35,9% 34,9% 21,2% 27,1% 91,8% 
1930-34 18,4% 5,4% 5,8% 23,7% 32,0% 19,6% 23,7% 71,2% 
1935-39 23,3% 13,3% 12,4% 25,4% 32,8% 23,0% 30,4% 69,7% 
1940-44 26,5%   25,4%   32,1% 28,5% 24,4% 58,4% 
1945-49 22,4%   23,2% 24,5%   17,9% 24,1% 51,4% 
1950-54 22,3% 26,7% 20,9% 25,0%   16,3% 22,5% 39,0% 
1955-59 22,0% 26,8% 18,6% 22,1% 33,0% 13,9% 17,6% 44,8% 
1960-64 21,3% 22,2% 20,2% 19,1% 40,4% 12,2% 13,8% 45,9% 
1965-69 19,6% 18,6% 22,2% 16,5% 39,4% 9,6% 11,4% 41,0% 
1970-74 15,9% 15,7% 18,4% 14,8% 28,3% 7,6% 10,4% 39,7% 
1975-79 12,3% 13,4% 16,9% 12,7% 19,0% 4,6% 6,9% 32,1% 
1980-84 11,5% 11,6% 14,3% 14,0% 17,1% 3,9% 7,8% 27,9% 
1985-89 13,1% 13,1% 16,6% 15,7% 17,4% 6,1% 9,7% 27,6% 
1990-94 12,6% 14,3% 17,8% 14,8% 14,1% 5,3% 9,4% 28,9% 
1995-99 13,9% 14,8% 19,2% 15,4% 11,0% 8,5% 14,5% 34,9% 
2000-04 12,9% 14,9% 18,0% 14,3% 10,2% 7,5% 12,2% 32,2% 
2005-09 13,4% 17,0% 18,2% 15,1% 9,2% 7,3% 13,8% 34,0% 
 Rate of profit in peripheral countries, five year averages (1950-2010) 
Years  Periph. Countr. Australia Brazil Chile China Korea Spain Mexico 
1950-54             45,4% 46,7% 
1955-59 42,3%   43,1%     36,2% 45,2% 40,5% 
1960-64 39,9% 31,3% 37,4% 35,7%   47,7% 40,2% 40,7% 
1965-69 38,6% 26,5% 37,0% 36,1%   55,1% 34,6% 40,1% 
1970-74 37,5% 23,6% 42,8% 29,7%   55,0% 32,9% 38,6% 
1975-79 32,6% 17,9% 36,2% 23,4% 29,7% 61,5% 25,1% 32,4% 
1980-84 26,5% 17,6% 22,3% 26,8% 30,3% 30,5% 24,9% 31,5% 
1985-89 26,5% 18,4% 15,5% 28,3% 33,1% 31,4% 31,2% 26,2% 
1990-94 26,7% 20,1% 14,7% 31,9% 31,4% 30,2% 26,5% 29,5% 
1995-99 26,3% 21,7% 23,5% 29,2% 27,4% 18,0% 28,1% 27,6% 
2000-04 24,8% 23,4% 22,3% 24,7% 25,6% 12,3% 29,1% 28,6% 
2005-09 24,8% 24,0% 22,7% 30,3% 26,2% 6,8% 26,0% 28,4% 
 
Methodological Annex 
 
Germany: Tables DE1 (1950-2010) and DE1C (1850-1950) from Piketty & Zucman 
database on Germany. Available at http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capitalisback/Germany.xls 
.16 
Argentina: Rate of profit series from Maito.17 
Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), tables 34 (Income) and 56 (Capital 
Stock) for 1960-2011. Available at www.abs.gov.au . 
Brazil: Series of fixed reproductive capital and net profits from chart C2 (p.466) in 
Grinberg (1953-2005), and operating surplus and fixed reproductive capital nominal 
variations from  IPEADATA – www.ipeadata.gov.br – for the last years18. 
Chile: Official capital stock series from Banco Central de Chile (1985-2010) – 
www.bcentral.cl -. For previous years, capital stock from Souza & Feu, investment prices 
from Braun et al, and reproductive construction participation from Aguilar & Collinao. The 
resulting series were linked with the official. Net profits available on CEPALSTAT19. 
China: Rate of profit over fixed reproductive capital from Bai et al (1978-2005), linked with 
series from Hongbin et al for the last years20. 
Korea: Series of fixed reproductive capital and net profits from chart C15 (p.471) in 
Grinberg (1956-2005), and operating surplus and fixed reproductive capital nominal 
variations from  KOSTAT – www.kostat.go.kr/eng - for the last years21. 
Spain: Rate of profit over fixed reproductive capital from Camara Izquierdo (1954-2002) 
and operating surplus and fixed reproductive capital nominal variations from  Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística (INE) – www.ine.es – for the last years22. 
United States: Rate of profit from Duménil & Lévy database (1869-2010), en    
www.jourdan.ens.fr/levy/uslt4x.txt  . 
Netherlands: Income and fixed reproductive capital series from Smits et al (1850-1913). 
Profit series from Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) – www.cbs.nl – and fixed 
                                                          
16
 Piketty, Thomas & Gabriel Zucman (2013) Capital is back. Wealth-income ratios in rich countries 
1700-2010, en http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/PikettyZucman2013WP.pdf . 
17
 Maito, Esteban, La Argentina y la tendencia descendente de la tasa de ganancia 1910-2011, 
Revista Realidad Económica N°275, pp.127-152, Buenos Aires, 2013 
18
Grinberg, Nicolás, Transformations in the Korean and Brazilian processes of capitalist 
development between the mid-1950s and the mid-2000s: the political economy of late 
industrialisation. Tesis de doctorado, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Londres, 2011.  
19
 Souza, Marcos & Aumara Feu, Capital stock in Latin America: 1950-2000, E&E N°50, Brasil, 
2005. 
Braun, Juan, et al, Economía chilena 1810-1995. Estadísticas históricas, DT N°187 del Instituto de 
Economía, Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 2000. 
Aguilar, Ximena & Collinao, María Paz, Cálculo del stock de capital para Chile 1985-2000, DT 
N°133,  Banco Central de Chile, Santiago, 2001. 
20
 Bai, Chong-En, Chang-Tai Hsieh & Yingyi Qian, The return to capital in China, NBER Working 
Paper N°12.755, 2006. 
Hongbin, Qu, Julia Wang & Sun Junwel, Return on capital: perception vs reality, HSBC Global 
Research, Hong Kong, 2013. 
21
 Grinberg, Nicolás, op.cit. 
22
 Camara Izquierdo, Sergio, La onda larga capitalista en España (1954-2002), Revista Sociedad 
Brasileña de Economía Política pp.86-111, Río de Janeiro, 2006. 
reproductive capital from Groote et al and CBS (1921-2010) using perpetual inventory 
method23. 
Japan: Series of fixed reproductive capital and net profits (1955-2010) from Statistics 
Bureau of Japan (SBJ) - www.stat.go.jp/english/  -. For previous years, official series 
available at Hayashi & Prescott and Moriguchi & Saez24. 
Mexico: Rate of profit from Mariña Flores (1950-2004), and operating surplus and fixed 
reproductive capital nominal variations from  Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 
(INEGI) -  www.inegi.org.mx – for the last years25. 
United Kingdom: Fixed reproductive capital from Office for National Statistics (ONS) – 
www.ons.gov.uk – and net profits from Piketty & Zucman (1855-2010), available at 
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capitalisback/UK.xls 26. 
Sweden: Series of fixed reproductive capital and net profits from Edvinsson (1850-2000), 
and operating surplus and fixed reproductive capital nominal variations from  Statistiska 
Centralbyrån (SCB) – www.scb.se – for the last years27. 
 
 
The rates were weighted by GDP from Maddison tables (1955-2008). In 2009-10, series 
were expanded using UNSTAT real GDP growth rates. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Groote, Peter, Roland Albers & Herman De Jong,  A standardized time series of the stock of 
fixed capital in the Netherlands, 1900-1995, GGDC Working Paper N°25, Groningen, 1996. 
Smits, Jan Pieter, Edwin Horlings & Jan Luiten van Zanden, Dutch GNP and its components, 1800-
1913, GGDC Monograph Series N°5, Groningen, 2000. 
24
 Hayashi, Fumio & Edward Prescott, The Depressing Effect of Agricultural Institutions on the 
Prewar Japanese Economy, Journal of Political Economy Vol.116 N°4, 2008 
Moriguchi, Chiaki & Emmanuel Saez, The evolution of income concentration in Japan 1886-2005: 
evidence from income tax statistics, Review of Economics and Statistics Vol.90 N°4, 2008. 
25
 Mariña Flores, Abelardo, La crisis mexicana de 2008-2010 en perspectiva histórica y en el 
contexto de la crisis mundial, en María Beatriz García Castro (coord.), “Estudios sobre México en la 
crisis mundial: escenario nacional tras dos décadas de apertura y desregulación”, UAM-A, México, 
2012. 
26
 Piketty, Thomas  & Gabriel Zucman, op.cit. 
27
 Edvinsson, Rodney, Historical national accounts for Sweden 1800-2000 (en 
www.historicalstatistics.org), Universidad Stockholm, Stockholm, 2005. 
 
